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Abstract 
We present an exercise where we identify optimal income tax rules according to various social welfare criteria. 
Empirical applications of optimal taxation theory have typically adopted analytical expressions for the optimal taxes 
and then imputed numerical values to their parameters by using calibration procedures or previous econometric 
estimates. Besides the restrictiveness of the assumptions needed to obtain analytical solutions to the optimal taxation 
problem, a shortcoming of that procedure is the possible inconsistency between the theoretical assumptions and the 
assumptions implicit in the empirical results. In this paper we follow a different procedure, based on a computational 
approach to the optimal taxation problem. To this end, we estimate a microeconometric model with 78 parameters that 
capture heterogeneity in consumption-leisure preferences for singles and couples as well as in job opportunities across 
individuals based on detailed Norwegian household data for 1994. The estimated model is used to simulate the labour 
supply choices made by single individuals and couples under different tax rules. We then identify optimal taxes – 
within a class of 10-parameter piecewise-linear rules – by iteratively running the model until a given social welfare 
function attains its maximum under the constraint of keeping constant the total net tax revenue.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper presents an empirical analysis of optimal income taxation. The purpose is not new, but the 
exercise illustrated here differs in many important ways from previous attempts to empirically compute 
optimal taxes. The standard procedure adopted in the literature starts with some version of the optimal 
taxation framework originally set up in the seminal paper by Mirrlees (1971). The next step typically consists 
of imputing numerical values – either determined by calibration or taken from previous empirical analysis – 
to the parameters (e.g. labour supply elasticities) appearing in the formulas produced by the theory. This 
literature is surveyed by Tuomala (1990). A recent strand of research adopts a similar approach to address 
the inverse optimal taxation problem, i.e. retrieving the social welfare function that makes optimal a given 
tax rule (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2005). There are two main problems with the optimal taxation literature: 
1) The theoretical results become amenable to an operational interpretation only by adopting rather 
restrictive assumptions concerning the preferences, the composition of the population and the structure of the 
tax rule; 2) The empirical measures used as counterparts of the theoretical concepts are usually derived from 
previous estimates obtained under assumptions different from those used in the theoretical model. As a 
consequence the consistency between the theoretical model and the empirical measures is dubious and the 
significance of the numerical results remains uncertain. The typical outcome of these exercises envisages a 
lump-sum transfer which is progressively taxed away by very high marginal tax rates (MTR) on lower 
incomes (i.e. a negative income tax mechanism); beyond the “break-even point” (i.e. the income level where 
the transfer is completely exhausted), the MTR are close to constant. Recent papers by Tuomala (2006, 
2010) suggest however that these results are essentially forced by the restrictive assumptions made upon 
preferences, labour supply elasticities and distribution of productivities (or wage rates). Interestingly, when 
Tuomala (2010) adopts a more flexible specification of the utility function he finds that the optimal system is 
progressive with monotonically increasing MTR. 
 While most of the studies mentioned above were essentially illustrative numerical exercises, 
several recent contributions have attempted to use optimal taxation results in the empirical evaluation or 
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design of tax-transfer reforms. Revesz (1989) and Saez (2001) make Mirrlees’s results more easily 
interpretable by reformulating them in terms of labour (or income) supply elasticities in order to provide a 
direct link between theoretical results and empirical measures. Saez (2002) develops a model amenable to 
empirical implementation that focuses on the relative magnitude of the labour supply elasticities at the 
extensive and intensive margin.  Immervoll et al. (2007) adopt Saez’s (2002) approach to evaluate alternative 
income support policies in European countries. Blundell et al. (2009) and Haan and Wrohlich (2010) also use 
Saez (2002) to evaluate taxes and transfers for lone mothers in Germany and UK, whereas Kleven et al. 
(2009) provide results on the taxation of couples. Although these new contributions are interesting attempts 
to advance towards the empirical implementation of theoretical optimal taxation results, they still rely on 
restrictive assumptions and suffer from a possible inconsistency between the theoretical model and the 
empirical measures used to implement it. For example, the model proposed by Saez (2002) does not account 
for income effects1 and moreover relies on rather restrictive assumptions upon  the way the households  
respond to changes in the relative attractiveness of the opportunities in the budget set.2 When it comes to 
empirical applications (as in Immervoll et al.  (2007), Blundell et al. (2009) and Haan and Wrohlich (2010)), 
the parameters of the theoretical models are given numerical values estimated with microeconometric models 
that do not adopt the same restrictive assumptions of Saez (2002). Of course some of those limitations and 
potential inconsistencies might be overcome in the future, but it remains unlikely that analytical solutions of 
the optimal income taxation problem will ever be able to be fully consistent with flexible structural labour 
supply models. We follow here a different and possibly complementary approach. We do not start from 
theoretical results dictating conditions for optimal tax rules under various assumptions. Instead we use a 
microeconometric model of labour supply in order to identify by simulation the tax rule that maximizes a 
social welfare function under the constraints that the households maximize their own utility and the total net 
tax revenue remains constant. The microeconometric simulation approach is common in evaluating tax 
reforms, but has not been much used in empirical optimal taxation studies.3 The closest examples adopting a 
                                                     
1 Income effects can be accounted for, as in Saez (2001), at the cost of notable analytical and computational complications. 
2 In Saez (2002) each individul can only choose among three opportunities: non-participation and two adjacent labour income 
brackets. 
3 A recent survey of microsimulation analyses of tax systems is provided by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006). 
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similar approach are represented by Aaberge and Colombino (2006) and Blundell and Shephard (2009) 
whilst Fortin et al. (1993), Colombino (2009) and Colombino et al. (2010) use a simulation approach for 
evaluation tax reforms.4 Analytical solutions are still crucial for understanding the “grammar” of the problem 
and for suggesting promising directions of reform. By contrast, microeconometric models and computational 
solutions allow to introduce less restrictive specifications of preferences and opportunity sets and to evaluate 
more complex tax-transfer rules.  
 Obviously, the result of our computational exercise cannot claim similar generality as the analytical 
solutions. While the latter establishes an explicit relationship between the fundamentals of the economy 
(preferences, skill distribution etc.), the former is application-specific (in this paper: Norway-specific): this is 
the price of accounting for a more detailed and flexible representation of preferences and opportunity sets. In 
principle, however, this limitation of our computational exercise could be overcome. By performing similar 
exercises on many different economies, one should again be able to identify – empirically – a more general 
relationship between the fundamentals of the economy and the optimal income tax rule. 
 As explained in Section 2, the microeconometric model used in this study contains 78 parameters 
that capture the heterogeneity in preferences and opportunities among households and individuals. The 
estimated model is used to simulate the choices given a particular tax rule. Those choices are therefore 
generated by preferences and opportunities that vary across the decision units. However, since preferences 
are heterogeneous and some individuals live as singles whereas others form families and live together, when 
it comes to social evaluation it does not make sense to treat the estimated utility functions as comparable 
individual welfare functions. To solve the interpersonal comparability problem we adopt a method that 
consists of using a common utility function in order to produce interpersonally comparable individual 
welfare measures to be used as arguments of the social welfare function. The common utility function is 
justified as a normative standard where the social planner treats individuals symmetrically and it is only used 
                                                     
4 Fortin et al. (1993) use a calibrated (not estimated) model with rather restrictive (Stone-Geary) preferences and focus on alternative 
income support schemes rather than on the whole tax rule. Aaberge and Colombino (2006) report on preliminary results of a simpler 
version of the exercise illustrated in this paper. Colombino et al. (2009, 2010) analyse basic income support mechanisms in some 
European countries. Blundell and Shephard (2009) identify the optimal design of a specific UK policy addressed to low income 
families with children. They do not treat the problem of interpersonal comparability, which however in their case might be less 
important given the smaller and less heterogeneous target population. 
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to compute and compare the individual welfare levels that provide the basis for the social welfare evaluation 
of tax reforms; it is not used for simulating household behaviour (where instead the estimated individual 
utility functions are used). This procedure, which circumvents the problem of interpersonal comparability of 
heterogeneous preferences, is well-established in the empirical public economics literature. It is proposed in 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and in Hammond (1991), and it forms the basis for the definition and 
measurement of a money-metric measure of utility in King (1983) and in Aaberge et al. (2004). Moreover, it 
has been applied for example by Fortin et al. (1993), Colombino (1998, 2009) and Colombino et al. (2010). 
As a practical matter, an average of the estimated individual utility functions or an estimated utility function 
(individual welfare function) with common parameters (as in our case) is typically used.  
 A brief description of the microeconometric model is presented in Section 2, while the empirical 
specification of the model and the estimates of the model parameters are provided by Aaberge and 
Colombino (2011). In order to illustrate the behavioural implications of the estimates, Section 2.2.1 reports 
wage elasticities of labour supply, whereas income elaticities are presented by Aaberge and Colombino 
(2011). Since the microeconometric model, once estimated, is used for a rather ambitious purpose – 
simulating choices in view of identifying optimal tax rules – it is important to check its reliability: ultimately, 
the model should be judged in its ability to do the job it is built for, i.e. predicting the outcomes of policy 
changes. In Section 2.2.2 we therefore perform an out-of-sample prediction exercise. Namely, we use the 
model (estimated on 1994 data) to predict household-specific distributions of income in Norway in 2001. We 
then compare the predicted distributions to the observed ones. The prediction performance turns out to be 
very satisfactory. In Sections 3.1 and 3.2 we introduce measures of individual welfare that allow 
interpersonal comparisons. Section 3.3 defines alternative rank-dependent social welfare functions with 
varying degree of inequality-aversion that are used to aggregate the individual welfare levels. In Section 3.4 
we explain the computational procedure used: we identify optimal tax-transfer schedules – within a class of 
10-parameter piecewise-linear rules – by iteratively running the model until a given social welfare function 
attains its maximum under the constraint of keeping the total net tax revenue fixed. The parameters to be 
determined are five MTR, four “kink points” and a lump-sum transfer that can be positive or negative. The 
resulting optimal rules are presented in Section 4. Section 5 contains the final comments.   
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2. The modeling framework 
2.1. The microeconometric labour supply model 
In this section we present a sketch of the microeconometric model. A full description is given in Aaberge and 
Colombino (2011). The model can be considered as an extension of the standard multinomial logit model, 
and differs from the traditional models of labour supply in several respects.5 First, it accounts for observed as 
well as unobserved heterogeneity in tastes and choice constraint. Second, it includes both single person 
households and married or cohabiting couples making joint labour supply decisions. A proper model of the 
interaction between spouses in their labour supply decisions is important as most of the individuals are 
married or cohabiting. Third, by taking all the details of the tax system into account, the budget sets become 
complex and non-convex in certain intervals.  
 For expository simplicity we consider in this section only the behaviour of a single person 
household. The extension to couples is fully explained  in Aaberge and Colombino (2011). The agents 
choose among jobs characterized by the wage rate w, hours of work h and other characteristics j. The 
problem solved by the agent is the following: 
(2.1) 
   , , ,max , , ,
s.t.
( , )


w h s j B
U c h s j
c f wh I
 
where  
h =  hours of work,  
w = the pre-tax wage rate,  
s = observed job characteristics (besides h and w, e.g. occupational sector), 
j = unobserved (by the analyst) job and/or household characteristics, 
I = the pre-tax non-labour income (exogenous),  
                                                     
5 Examples of previous applications of this approach are found in Aaberge et al.(1995, 1999, 2000). These models are close to other 
recent contributions adopting a discrete choice approach such as Dickens and Lundberg (1993), Euwals and van Soest (1999), Flood 
et al. (2004) and Labeaga et al. (2007).   
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c = net disposable income, 
 f = tax rule that transforms gross pre-tax incomes (wh,I) into net disposable income c,  
B = the set of all opportunities available to the household (including non-market opportunities, i.e. a “job” 
with 0w   and 0h  ). 
 Agents can differ not only in their preferences and in their wage (as in the traditional model) but 
also in the number of available jobs of different types. Moreover, for the same agent, wage rates (unlike in 
the traditional model) can differ from job to job. Let ( , , )p h w s denote the density of available jobs of type 
( , , ).h w s  By representing the choice set B by a probability density p we can for example allow for the fact 
that jobs with hours of work in a certain range are more or less likely to be found, possibly depending on 
agents’ characteristics; or for the fact that for different agents the relative number of market opportunities 
may differ. We assume that the utility function can be factorised as 
(2.2)    ( , ), , , ( , ), , ( )U f wh I h s j v f wh I h s j , 
where v and are respectively the systematic and the random component. The term is a random variable 
that accounts for the effect on utility of all the characteristics of the household-job match that are observed 
by the household but not by us. Moreover, we assume that  is i.i.d. according to Type III Extreme Value 
distribution. We observe the chosen h , w and s. Therefore we can specify the probability that the agent 
chooses a job with observed characteristics (h,w,s). It can be shown that, under the assumptions (2.1) - (2.2)  
and given the extreme value distribution for ε, we can write the probability density function of a choice 
(h,w,s) as6 
(2.3)   
( , , )
( ( , ), , ) ( , , )( , , ) Pr ( ( , ), , ) max ( ( , ), , )
( ( , ), ) ( , , )x y z B
v f wh I h s p h w sh w s U f wh I h s U f xy I y z
v f xy I y p x y z dxdydz


         . 
                                                     
6 For the derivation of the choice density (2.3), see Aaberge et al. (1999). Note that (2.3) can be considered as a special case of the 
more general framework developed by Dagsvik (1994). A more specialized type of continuous multinomial logit was introduced by 
Ben-Akiva and Watanatada (1981). 
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where ( , )p h w is the density of choice opportunities which can be interpreted as the relative frequency (in the 
choice set B) of opportunities with hours h and wage rate w. Opportunities with 0h (and 0w ) are non-
market opportunities (i.e. alternative allocations of "leisure"). The density (2.3) is the contribution of an 
observation (h, w,s) to the likelihood function, which is then maximized in order to estimate the parameters 
of ( ( , ), , )v f hw I h s and ( , , )p h w s . The intuition behind expression (2.3) is that the probability of a choice 
(h,w,s) can be expressed as the relative attractiveness – weighted by a measure of “availability” ( , , )p h w s – 
of jobs of type (h, w, s).  It is important to stress that in the model household members choose among jobs 
(characterized by h, w and other characteristics s and j), not just among different values of h. Therefore 
households’ responses include many dimensions:  hours, wage rates and non-pecuniary job characteristics.  
 Given convenient parametric specifications of the functions v and p, the 78 parameters of the model 
can be estimated by maximizing the likelihood function formed on the basis of expression (2.3). The 
estimation is based on 1994 data collected by the 1995 Norwegian Survey of Level of Living, which includes 
detailed income data from tax reported records.7 We have restricted the ages of the individuals to be between 
20 and 62 in order to minimize the inclusion in the sample of individuals who in principle are eligible for 
retirement, since analysis of retirement decisions is beyond the scope of this study. Moreover, self-employed 
as well as individuals receiving permanent disability benefits are excluded from the sample. The sample 
contains 1842 couples, 309 single females and 312 single males. The estimates are reported in Aaberge and 
Colombino (2011). 
 
2.2. Behavioural implications 
In this section we illustrate some of the behavioural implication of the estimates. First, we present wage 
elasticities of labour supply because they are useful for the understanding and the interpretation of the 
optimal taxation results that will be presented in Section 4. Second, since the model will be used for a rather 
ambitious operation (computing optimal tax-transfer rules) we report on the prediction performance of the 
model with an out-of-sample exercise in Section 2.2.2. 
                                                     
7 At the time of performing the exercise presented in this paper, the 1994 sample was chosen due to the relatively stable 
macroeconomic conditions. 
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2.2.1 Elasticities  
The wage elasticities reported in Tab. 2.1 are computed by means of stochastic simulation. Note that the 
households face exogenous opportunity density functions, from which we can obtain the wage density 
function (Aaberge and Colombino, 2006, 2010). In order to compute the wage elasticities, we first increment 
by1 per cent the means of the wage densities and we simulate the new choices. Given the simulated 
responses of each individual, we aggregate them to compute the aggregate elasticities. We find that the 
overall wage elasticity is equal to 0.12, which suggests rather low behavioural responses from wage and tax 
changes. However, by looking behind the overall elasticity, the picture changes substantially. The major 
features of the estimated labour supply elasticities can be summarized as follows: (a) labour supply of 
married women is far more elastic than for married men; (b) individuals belonging to low-income 
households are much more elastic than individuals belonging to high-income households. As demonstrated 
by the review of Røed and Strøm (2002) these findings are consistent with the findings in many recent 
studies.8  
[ Table 2.1 ] 
 In principle, elasticities such as those illustrated above might be used to compute optimal tax-
transfer rules, e.g. by following the line developed – among others - by Diamond (1988), Revesz (1989), 
Saez (2001), Saez (2002), Blundell et al. (2009) and Kleven et al. (2009). As we explained in Section 1, we 
think that this procedure is not totally satisfactory, due to the possible inconsistency between the assumptions 
adopted by the theoretical optimal taxation model and the assumptions adopted in producing the empirical 
evidence. Our microeconometric estimates are based on assumptions that are much more flexible and general 
than those leading to the theoretical results for example of Diamond (1988) and Saez (2001, 2002). We 
follow a different approach and obtain the optimal tax-transfer rule computationally, i.e. we iteratively run 
the microeconometric model of household behaviour until the social welfare function is maximized under the 
constraint of total tax revenue.   
                                                     
8 Aaberge and Colombino (2006, 2011) compute also income elasticities, and show how the income elasticities vary with respect to 
changes in different non-labour components and how they depend on gender, household type and location in the income distribution. 
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2.2.2. Prediction performance of the microeconometric model under the 1994 and 2001 tax systems  
This section illustrates the prediction performance of the model. We present an out-of-sample prediction 
were we use the model estimated on the 1994 sample and the 2001 data (exogenous variables) from the 2002 
Norwegian Survey of Level of Living, in order to predict the choices made in 2001 under the new 2001 tax 
rules. .9 Tables 2.2 and 2.3 describe some of the characteristics of the 1994 and 2001 tax regimes.  
[Tables 2.2 and 2.3] 
The basic features of the Norwegian 1994 tax system were assessed by a major tax reform of 1992, which  
introduced a so-called dual income tax system characterized by a 28 percent flat tax rate on capital income in 
combination with progressive tax rates on labour income plus 7.8 percent social insurance contribution. 
Moreover, the tax base of business income was substantially broadened and various previous tax credits and 
deductions were removed. To reduce incentives for taxpayers to classify labour income as capital income 
rules for mandatory income splitting were established for dividing business income into capital and labour 
income, and the resulting imputed wage income was taxed according to a two-bracket progressive surtax. 
The associated top marginal tax rates for wage earners and owners of small businesses were 49.5 percent and 
52.4 percent in1994. Between1992 and 2001 marginal rates as well as the threshold of the highest bracket of 
the surtax increased, resulting in the statutory tax rates for 2001 shown in Table 2.3. Disposable income is 
the variable used for comparing predicted outcomes to observed outcomes. The predictions are obtained 
individual by individual, evaluating the utility function – including the stochastic component drawn from the 
Type III extreme value distribution – at each alternative and identifying the selected alternative as the one 
with the highest utility level. The individual predictions are then aggregated into the 10 means of the 10 
income deciles. Table 2.4 reports the results of an out-of-sample prediction exercise. The model turns out to 
be rather successful in reproducing the income distribution.  
[ Tables 2.4] 
                                                     
9 Both 1994 and 2001 data are characterized by relatively stable macroeconomic conditions. 
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3. The design of optimal income taxes 
3.1. The framework of the social planner 
The literature on optimal taxation relies on social welfare functions defined as summary measures of the 
distribution of individual utility levels, where utility levels are assumed to be interpersonally comparable. 
The latter assumption is uncontroversial when one imposes the consumption-leisure preferences to be 
homogeneous. However, since the microeconomic labour supply model used in this study allows 
heterogeneous preferences for leisure and consumption and moreover some individuals live as singles 
whereas others live in a couple, it does not make sense to treat the estimated utility functions as comparable 
individual welfare functions. Thus, it is necessary to introduce measures of individual welfare that permit 
interpersonal comparisons.10 Section 3.2 explains the method used for dealing with this problem, whereas in 
Section 3.3 we discuss the methods that will be used for aggregating individual welfare levels into a social 
welfare function. Section 3.4 explains the computational procedure used to determine the optimal tax-
transfer schedules. 
 
3.2. Individual welfare functions 
The social planner wants to compare gains in welfare of some households to losses in welfare of other 
households as part of the evaluation of a tax reform. Unless one is prepared to assert that heterogeneous 
consumption-leisure preferences are comparable, one has somehow to solve the interpersonal comparability 
problem. In the context of empirical applications, there is only one type of solution convincingly elaborated 
in the literature, consisting in using a common utility function to evaluate the bundles chosen by households 
according to their own preferences. This approach is advocated, among others, by Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980), King (1983) and Hammond (1991). The common utility function (or individual welfare function) V 
is to be interpreted just as the input of a social welfare function. It is not used to simulate behaviour; it is only 
                                                     
10 See Boadway et al. (2002) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) for a discussion of interpersonal comparability of utility when 
preferences for leisure differ between individuals. 
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used to evaluate – in a comparable way – the results of choices made according to the actual individual 
utility functions. The different roles played by the actual utility function U and the individual welfare 
function V are also explained in Section 4 where we specify the various steps of the simulation used to 
identify the optimal tax rules.   
The individual welfare function V used by the social planner is specified as follows: 
(3.1) 
31
2 4
1 3
1 1log ( , ) y LV y h

  
          
 
where L is leisure, defined as  1 8736L h  , and y is the equivalent individuals income after tax defined 
by 
(3.2)     
 
 
, for singles
1 , , for married/cohab. individuals.
2 2 F F M M
c f wh I
y c f w h w h I
   
 
 The Box-Cox functional form of expression (3.1) is the same adopted for specifying the utility functions in 
the microeconometric model (Aaberge and Colombino, 2006, 2011). By dividing the couple income by 2  
we transform incomes of couples into comparable single individual incomes.11 In order to estimate the 
parameters of the individual welfare function (3.1) we use expression (2.3) with the systematic part of the 
utility function (v) replaced by the individual welfare function (V) and conditional on the estimated 
opportunity densities p. The sample is the same used for estimating the microeconometric model of Section 
2.1. Table 3.1 displays the parameter estimates of V.  
[Table 3.1] 
 A different way to circumvent the interpersonal comparability problem consists in avoiding 
interpersonal welfare level comparisons altogether and basing the social evaluation exclusively on ordinal 
                                                     
11 The “square root scale” is one of the equivalence scales commonly used in OECD publications. The number of household 
members, including children, is taken into account in the specification of the utility function, where it affects the marginal utilities of  
income and leisure (Aaberge and Colombino 2006, 2011).  
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comparisons. We provide an example of this method in Table 4.5, where we presents the number of 
“winners” under the optimal tax rules.12  
3.3. Social Welfare Functions 
When evaluating the distribution of individual welfare effects of a tax system and/or a tax reform it is 
required to summarize the gains and losses by a social welfare function. The simplest welfare function is the 
one that adds up the comparable welfare gains over individuals. The objection to the linear additive welfare 
function is that the individuals are given equal welfare weights, independent of whether they are poor or rich. 
Concern for distributive justice requires, however, that poor individuals are assigned larger welfare weights 
than rich individuals. This structure is captured by the family of rank-dependent welfare functions,13 
(3.3) 
1
1
0
( ) ( ) , 1,2,...,W q t F t dt i 
 
where F-1 is the left inverse of the cumulative distribution function of the individual welfare levels V with 
mean , and ( )q t  is a positive weight-function defined on the unit interval. The social welfare functions (3.3) 
can be given a similar normative justification as is underlying the “expected utility” social welfare functions 
introduced by Atkinson (1970). Given suitable continuity and dominance assumptions for the preference 
ordering ;  defined on the family of income distributions F, Yaari (1988, 1989) demonstrated that the 
following axiom, 
Axiom (Dual independence). Let F1, F2 and F3 be members of F and let  0,1   Then 1 2F F;  implies 
   1 11 1 1 11 3 2 3(1 ) (1 )F F F F          ; , 
                                                     
12 This is just an illustration, whereas a proper application of the ordinal criterion would require defining the optimal tax in a 
different way; for example the tax rule that maximizes the number of winners.  
13 Several other authors have discussed the rationale for rank-dependent measures of inequality and social welfare, see e.g. Sen 
(1974), Hey and Lambert (1980), Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983), Weymark (1981), Ben Porath and Gilboa (1992) and 
Aaberge (2001). 
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characterizes the family of rank-dependent measures of social welfare functions (4.3)  where ( )q t  is a 
positive non-decreasing function of t. We refer to Yaari (1987, 1988) for a discussion of the difference 
between the dual independence axiom and the conventional independence axiom used to justify the 
“expected utility” social welfare functions.  In this paper we use the following specification of ( )q t ,  
 (3.4)  1
log , 1
( )
1 , 2,3,....
1
i i
t i
q t i it
i

     
 
Note that the inequality aversion exhibited by the social welfare function Wi (associated with ( )iq t ) decreases 
with increasing i. As , ii W   approaches inequality neutrality and coincides with the linear additive 
welfare function defined by 
(3.5) 
1
1
0
( )W F t dt    . 
It follows by straightforward calculations that iW   for all i and that Wi is equal to the mean    for finite i 
if and only if F is the egalitarian distribution. Thus, Wi can be interpreted as the equally distributed individual 
welfare level. As recognized by Yaari (1988) this property suggests that Ci, defined by  
(3.6) 1 , 1, 2, ...ii
W
C i    
can be used as a summary measure of inequality14.  
 As noted by Aaberge (2000, 2007), C1 is actually equivalent to a measure of inequality that was 
proposed by Bonferroni (1930), whilst C2 is the Gini coefficient. As demonstrated by Aaberge (2000, 2007) 
C1 exhibits strong downside inequality aversion and is particularly sensitive to changes that concern the poor 
part of the population, whilst C2 normally pays more attention to changes that take place in the middle part of 
the income distribution. The C3-coefficient exhibits upside inequality aversion and is thus particularly 
                                                     
14 Note that Aaberge (2001) provides an axiomatic justification for using the Ck – measures as criteria for ranking Lorenz curves. 
Thus, the justification of the social welfare function  1i iW C   defined by (3.3) (and (3.6)) can also be made in terms of a value 
judgement of the trade-off between the mean and (in)equality in the distribution of welfare. 
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sensitive to changes that occur in the upper part of the income distribution. Due to the close relationship 
between C1, C2 and C3 Aaberge (2007) proposed to treat them as a group and call them Gini's Nuclear 
Family of inequality measures. 
 In order to ease the interpretation of the inequality aversion profiles exhibited by W1, W2, W3 and 
W∞, Table 3.2 provides the ratios of the corresponding weights – defined by (3.4) – of the median individual 
and the 1 per cent poorest, the 5 per cent poorest, the 30 per cent poorest and the 5 per cent richest individual 
for different social welfare criteria. As can be observed from the weight profiles provided by Table 3.2, W1 
will be particular sensitive to changes in policies that affect the welfare of the poor, whereas the inequality 
aversion profile of W3 is rather moderate and W  exhibits neutrality with respect to inequality. 
[Table 3.2] 
3.4. The Optimal Taxation Problem 
We strictly consider only personal income taxation. Following the tradition of the optimal income tax 
literature, all the other dimensions of the general tax system at large (VAT, consumption taxes, payroll taxes, 
social assistance etc.) are kept constant as of 1994 in Norway. The optimal taxation problem considered in 
this exercise can be formulated as follows:  
(3.7) 
            
 
 
 
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
, , ,
max , , , ,..., , , , , , ,..., ,
s.t.
, , , , , arg max , , , ,  s.t. ( , , ; )
2
n
F F F F NF NF M F M M NM NM
n nF nM nF nM n n F M F M n nF nF nM nM n
w h s j B
n
nF nM
nF nF nM nM
W V y h V y h V y h V y h V y h V y h
c h h s s j U c h h s s j c f w h w h I for all n
cwhere y y for all n
and w h w h



 
 
 
1
( , , ; ) .
N
n nF nF nM nM n
n
I f w h w h I M

  
 
For simplicity of exposition, expression (3.7) assumes that the N households are couples, while in fact we 
consider both couples and singles. In (3.7) each couple contributes to the social welfare functions with two 
terms corresponding to the individual welfare functions of the two partners. For single households, we have 
just one term  ,n nV y h and n ny c (according to expression (3.2)). All the variables are the same as those 
appearing in expression (2.1) in Section 2 and M is the current (1994) total net tax revenue.  The function 
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( , ; )n nF nF nM nM nc f w h w h I  , which transforms gross incomes ( , , )nF nF nM nM nw h w h I  into net available 
income nc , denotes a class of tax rules defined up to a vector of parameters . We will consider a class of 
piecewise-linear tax rules with a (positive or negative) lump-sum transfer and five income brackets. 
Therefore the parameters will be the amount of the lump-sum transfer, the lower and upper limits of the 
income brackets and the MTR applied to the income brackets. Household n maximizes her own utility given 
the tax rule ( , ; )nF nF nM nM nf w h w h I  by choosing the “job”  , , , , ,n nF nM nF nM nc h h s s j . Taking the individual 
utility-maximizing choices into account as a constraint (i.e. the incentive-compatibility constraint), the social 
planner searches for the tax rule – i.e. the parameter vector  – that maximizes the social welfare function W, 
subject to the constraint that the total net tax revenue must at least be as large as M. The social welfare 
function W takes as arguments the evaluations of the  chosen “jobs” according to the individual welfare 
function V . Given the very flexible and general specifications adopted for the random utility functions and 
of the opportunity sets (Aaberge and Colombino, 2011), problem (3.7) cannot be solved analytically. The 
maximization of W is performed by a global maximization procedure that efficiently scans the parameter 
space. At each run of the iterative procedure, the maximization of the individual utility function is simulated 
by the microeconometric model described in Section 2  
The search for the optimal tax rule is limited to the class of piecewise-linear rules, with five brackets: 
(3.8)    
   
1 1
1
1 1 1
1
4
1 5 4 4
1
if 0
if 2 3 4
if
k
i i i k k k k
i
i i i
i
z t z z z
c z t z z z z z z z ,k , ,
z t z z z z z z

 
 

  



                  


 
where c is net available income, z is the sum of gross market income (earnings plus capital income) and 
taxable public transfers,  1 2 5, ,...,    are the marginal tax rates applied to the five income brackets, iz is the 
upper limit of the i-th bracket (i = 1, 2, 3, 4), and t is a lump-sum that can be positive (i.e. a lump-sum 
transfer) or negative (i.e. a lump-sum tax). Thus, each particular tax rule is characterized by 10 
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parameters  1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4, , , , , , , , ,z z z z t     . The tax rule is quite flexible since the MTR are allowed to take any 
positive or negative value and the bracket-limits are allowed to take any positive value only subject to the 
constraints 1k kz z .  
 The tax rule specified by expression (3.8) replaces the current rule as of 1994, which is described 
by the example of Table 2.2 and also belongs to the class of piece-wise linear tax rules.15 The dataset is the 
same used for the estimation of the model (Section 2.1). 
 The identification of the optimal tax rules consists of four steps: 
1. For each household we simulate the opportunity set, which contains the observed job plus 199 
market and non-market alternatives drawn from the estimated p densities defined in Section 2.1. For 
each household and each alternative in the opportunity set we then draw a value from the Type III 
extreme value distribution. Next, the new tax rule is applied to individual earners’ gross incomes in 
order to obtain disposable incomes (income after tax) corresponding to each alternative in the choice 
set. For each household, a new choice -  , , , , ,F M F Mc h h s s j  for couples or  , , ,c h s j for singles - is 
given by the alternative that maximizes the household-specific utility functions defined by (2.2).16 
We refer to Aaberge and Colombino (2011) for further details. 
2. To each decision maker (wife or husband or single) an equivalent income y is imputed according to 
expression (3.2). The purpose of this procedure is to convert the distribution of incomes (c) across 
heterogeneous families into a distribution of (equivalent) incomes (y) across adult individuals.  
3. As a result of the previous steps, we now have for each individual a simulated pair (y, h). As 
explained in Section 3.2, we compute the individual welfare levels by applying to the chosen (y, h) 
the individual welfare function (3.1).  
4. We then compute the social welfare function iW   for 1,2,3,i   . 
                                                     
15 Taxes include the part of social security contributions paid by the employee. 
16 Colombino et al. (2010), Colombino (2009), Blundell and Shephard (2009) and Colombino (1998) use a different method, where 
the maximum utility attained under a given tax-transfer rule is not found by simulation but it is instead measured by the expected 
maximum utility (McFadden 1978). The two methods are asymptotically equivalent, but the method adopted in this paper turns out to 
be more flexible and robust for producing disaggregated results.  
18 
 
The optimization is performed by iterating the steps 1- 4 in order to find the tax rule in the class (3.8) that 
produces the highest value of iW   for each value of i, under the constraint of constant total tax revenue.
17  
 
4. The optimal tax-transfer schedules 
The results of our exercise are reported in Tables 4.1 - 4.5. Table 4.1 displays the optimal tax rules. In order 
to ease the comparability of the behavioural responses to the 1994 tax system and the various optimal tax 
systems we report proportions of individuals by family status in specific tax income brackets in Table 4.2. 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 provide additional information of the behavioural implications of the optimal tax rules. 
Table 4.5 displays the percentages of winners under the optimal rule by income deciles of the 1994 income 
distribution.   
[Tables 4.1 – 4.5] 
a) Under any social welfare function, the MTR are continuously increasing for all levels of income. 
Clearly the pattern of elasticities – sharply decreasing with respect to income – illustrated in Table 
2.1 contributes to the profile of the optimal MTR. The most striking results are represented by the 
negative MRT on the first bracket and by the 100 per cent MRT on the last bracket. A negative MTR 
on low incomes – in fact a subsidy or a tax credit on the wage rate – is close to policies actually 
implemented, such as the Working Families Tax Credit in the UK, the Earned Income Tax Credit in 
the USA and the In-Work Tax Credit in Sweden. Also Immervoll et al. (2007) – although adopting a 
different approach – find that a negative MTR for low incomes is best as an income support 
mechanism. Note however that the picture emerging from our results is more complex, since we 
keep fixed other current income support policies; moreover, our optimal rules envisages also a lump-
sum tax. The 100 per cent MTR on the last bracket – despite the fact that it could not be realistically 
implemented – does make sense within the limits of our model. As shown in Table 2.1, people in the 
richest decile exhibit on average a wage elasticity of labour supply equal, or very close, to zero (with 
the exception of married women). At least part of this segment of the population (1.5 per cent) is 
                                                     
17 The optimal tax-transfer parameters are determined by an iterative grid-search procedure developed by Tom Wennemo at the 
Research Department of Statistics Norway. Each optimization requires the evaluation of approximately 200 000 tax-transfer rules.  
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willing to work the same amount of hours despite a reduction of the net wage rate, and non-
pecuniary characteristics of the job (captured by the utility random component) may induce them to 
choose jobs where the marginal net wage is zero: part of their income becomes a rent and as such it 
is captured by the optimal tax rule. The overall picture emerging from our exercise is in sharp 
contrast with most of the results obtained by the numerical exercises based on Mirrlees’s optimal tax 
formulas. The typical outcome of those exercises envisages a positive lump-sum transfer which is 
progressively taxed away by very high marginal tax rates on lower incomes (i.e. a negative income 
tax mechanism); after the income level where the transfer is exhausted the tax rule is close to 
proportional. Recent papers by Tuomala (2006, 2010) suggest however that these results are 
essentially forced by the restrictive assumption typically made upon preferences, elasticities and 
distribution of productivities (or wage rates). 
b) Table 4.1 show that the more egalitarian the social welfare criterion is, the more progressive is the 
optimal tax rule. For example the optimal rule according to Bonferroni is more progressive than the 
optimal rule according to Gini, which in turn is more progressive than the optimal utilitarian rule.  
c) The lump-sum t turns out to be a tax. This result can be explained by the fact that individuals/couples 
with small and medium high incomes are particularly sensitive to changes in marginal taxes (see 
Table 2.1). Thus MTR on low and average incomes are kept low both for minimizing distortions and 
for fulfilling distributive goals. However, since the total net tax revenue must be kept unchanged, the 
optimal tax rule envisages a universal lump-sum tax. A possible practical implementation close to a 
lump-sum tax might be represented by a tax on wealth or on property (e.g. on owner-occupied 
houses). According to this interpretation, the optimal tax rules would imply – with respect to the 
1994 rule – a lower taxation on earnings complemented by a property tax.  Note however that the 
lump-sum tax and the negative MTR should be judged jointly. In the Bonferroni case, the joint effect 
of the two mechanisms account for 34.1 per cent of the total tax revenue, whereas in the remaining 
cases it amounts to a net transfer to the households (NOK 2 200 in the Utilitarian case).  
d) All the optimal rules imply a higher income after tax for most levels of gross income (Table 4.3). In 
other words, the optimal rules are able to extract the same total tax revenue from a larger total gross 
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income (i.e. applying a lower average tax rate). This result, together with those commented upon at 
point (a) above, provides a controversial perspective in view of the tax reforms implemented in 
many developed countries during the last decades. In most cases those reforms embodied the idea of 
improving efficiency and labour supply incentives through a lower average tax rate and lower MTR 
on the highest incomes.18 Our results give clearly support to the first part: lowering the average tax 
rate; as to the second part, the picture is less clear-cut: our results suggest that a lower average tax 
rate should be mainly obtained by lowering the marginal and average tax rates particularly on low 
and average incomes (and also on a substantial part of high incomes) and by sharply increasing them 
on very high income levels.19  
e) Table 4.4 shows that the strongest labour supply response comes from households in the lower 
income deciles, who are those who show a more elastic labour supply. While females in couples 
receive a stronger incentive to work under the Bonferroni regime than under the Utilitarian regime, 
the opposite is the case for the males. This happens because the wife faces on average lower wages 
than the husband and the more relevant tax brackets for her are the lower ones, those where the 
Bonferroni regime imposes much lower MTR than the Utilitarian regime (and than the current 
regime). On the other hand, the Utilitarian regime is especially favourable (also compared to the 
current regime) for those who decide to locate themselves in high tax brackets, where husbands are 
more likely to be found. The implication is that a more egalitarian criterion also involves stronger 
work incentives for married women (and especially those in the lower income deciles), and therefore 
also a more egalitarian inter-gender distribution of income.  
f) Table 4.5 shows the percentage of winners under the optimal rules, by marital status, gender and 
household income decile under the current 1994 rule. An individual is defined as a winner if her/his 
welfare is higher under the new tax rule than under the current 1994 rule. All the optimal rules would 
largely “win the referendum” against the current rule, since they all imply a strong majority of 
                                                     
18 For example Blundell (1996) reports that during the 80’s and early 90’s in some countries the top marginal tax rates were cut from 
70-80 per cent down to about 40-50 per cent. On these issues the discussion in Røed and Strøm (2001) is especially relevant.  
19 A second important difference between our exercise and the implemented reforms referred to in the main text, is that those reforms 
typically envisaged a reduction of the total tax revenue together with the reduction in the average tax rate, while in our simulations 
we keep the total tax revenue unchanged.  
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winners. The percentage of winners, however, varies substantially across the different subgroups and 
especially across income deciles. Singles women in the IX and X income deciles are the only ones 
who would “vote against” all the optimal tax rules. The current (1994) tax system provides important 
deductions for children. It appears that these deductions favour in particular the group of relatively 
well-off single women with children. The deductions are removed in the class of tax-transfer rule we 
optimize upon. As a consequence, a majority of those women loose under the optimal rules. 
5. Conclusions 
We have performed an exercise in designing optimal income taxes that – differently from what is typically 
done in the literature – does not rely on a priori theoretical optimal taxation results, but instead employs a 
microeconometric model of labour supply in order to maximize a social welfare function with respect to a 
parametrically defined income tax rule. Modern microeconometric models of labour supply are based on 
very general and flexible assumptions. They can accommodate many realistic features such as general 
structures of heterogeneous preferences, simultaneous decisions of household members, complicated (non-
convex, non continuous, non-differentiable etc.) constraints and opportunity sets, multidimensional 
heterogeneity of both households and jobs,  quantitative constraints etc. It is simply not feasible (at least so 
far) to obtain analytical solutions for the optimal income taxation problem in such environments. Yet those 
features are very relevant and important especially in view of evaluating or designing reforms. Analytical 
solutions remain indispensable for understanding the grammar of the problem and for suggesting promising 
classes of tax-transfer systems that can then be more deeply investigated with the microeconometric model. 
The philosophy inspiring this approach is similar to the one adopted since long ago in engineering and 
recently and successfully also in other applications of mechanism design (auctions, negotiation procedures, 
matching markets etc.) where analytical solutions are complemented by computational simulations or 
experiments that account for a host of realistic features that cannot be included in the theoretical model.20  
                                                     
20 Roth (2002) provides a very inspired survey of this approach. 
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The microeconometric model adopted in this paper and fully described in Aaberge and Colombino (2006, 
2011)  is designed to allow for a detailed description of complex choice sets and budget constraints. The 
model is used to identify by simulation the tax rule that maximizes a social welfare function.  We keep fixed 
the current (1994) system of transfers, income support and social assistance policies, but allow for a lump-
sum that can be positive (i.e. a transfer) or negative (i.e. a tax). We explore a variety of different social 
welfare criteria. The MTR always turn out to be monotonically increasing with income. More egalitarian 
social welfare functions tend to imply more progressive tax rules. For all the social welfare functions used, 
the optimal bottom MTR is negative and the optimal top MRT always turns out to be 100 per cent for 
sufficiently high gross income levels (depending on the social welfare function, approximately above 720 
000 – 790 000  NOK 1994), which concerns 1.5 per cent per cent of the tax payers. The negative MTR on 
the lowest income bracket suggests a mechanism close to policies like the WFTC in the UK or te EITC in the 
USA. The 100 per cent top MTR is explained by the inelastic labour supply at the top of the income 
distribution (Table 2.1) and by non-pecuniary characteristics that may make a job attractive even though it 
carries a 100 per cent marginal tax rate. All the optimal tax rules imply an average tax rate lower than the 
current 1994 one and imply – with respect to the current rule – lower marginal rates on low and/or average 
income levels and a higher marginal rate on very high income levels. The pattern of labour supply elasticities 
illustrated in Section 2.2.1 contributes to explaining the profile of the optimal tax rules. Our results are 
partially at odds with the tax reforms that took place in many countries during the last decades. While those 
reforms embodied the idea of lowering average tax rates, the way to implement it has typically consisted in 
reducing the top marginal rates. Our results instead suggest lowering average tax rates by reducing marginal 
rates except for very high income levels.   
 Even though we think that the approach illustrated here can usefully complement theoretical work 
and analytical solution and actually improve upon them concerning the representation of preferences, 
constraints and policies, clearly there are many dimensions of the tax-transfer rules that are relevant for their 
evaluation (e.g. implementation and administrative costs) but are beyond the purpose of our exercise. 
Moreover, some of the results illustrated in Section 4 might change with the inclusion in the behavioural 
model of features that are currently not accounted for. A candidate for further refinements is the modelling of 
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the choice by households at the top of the income distribution. For example the optimal top MTR might turn 
out to be lower than 100 per cent if we were able to include in the model other dimensions of households’ 
response such as inter-country mobility and taxable income.21 However, based on previous exercises where 
we constrained the top MTR to be lower than 100 per cent we expect that the overall qualitative features of 
the optimal tax rule are likely to remain unaffected.22  
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Table 2.1. Labour supply elasticities with respect to wage for single females, single males, married 
females and married males by deciles of household disposable income*. Norway 1994 
 Female elasticities Male elasticities Family status Type of elasticity 
Income decile 
under the 1994 
tax system 
Own wage
elasticities 
Cross 
elasticities 
Own wage 
elasticities 
Cross 
elasticities 
I 0.59  0.00  
II 0.45  0.00  
III-VIII 0.06  0.06  
IX 0.00  0.00  
X 0.00  0.00  
Elasticity of the probability 
of participation 
All 0.12  0.04  
I -0.17  0.77  
II -0.04  0.00  
III-VIII -0.08  -0.08  
IX -0.07  0.00  
X 0.00  0.00  
Elasticity of the conditional 
expectation of total supply 
of hours 
All -0.09  -0.02  
I 0.42  0.77  
II 0.42  0.00  
III-VIII -0.02  -0.02  
IX -0.07  0.00  
X 0.00  0.00  
Single females and 
males 
Elasticity of the 
unconditional expectation 
of total supply of hours 
All 0.02  0.02  
I 1.03 -0.28 0.90 -0.23 
II 0.35 -0.14 0.79 0.00 
III-VIII 0.14 -0.23 0.13 -0.10 
IX 0.12 -0.12 0.06 -0.06 
X 0.07 0.00 0.06 -0.19 
Elasticity of the probability 
of participation 
All 0.21 -0.19 0.23 -0.11 
I 1.51 -0.01 0.87 0.11 
II 0.62 -0.53 0.38 -0.08 
III-VIII 0.27 -0.24 0.18 -0.14 
IX 0.08 -0.22 0.02 -0.09 
X 0.19 -0.10 -0.02 -0.23 
Elasticity of the conditional 
expectation of total supply 
of hours 
All 0.31 -0.25 0.16 -0.13 
I 2.54 -0.29 1.77 -0.12 
II 0.97 -0.67 1.17 -0.08 
III-VIII 0.41 -0.47 0.31 -0.24 
IX 0.20 -0.34 0.08 -0.14 
X 0.26 -0.10 0.05 -0.42 
Married/cohabitating 
females and males 
Elasticity of the 
unconditional expectation 
of total supply of hours 
All 0.52 -0.42 0.39 -0.23 
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Table 2.2. Current tax rule in Norway as of 1994 for singles without children and couples without children and 
with two wage earners(*) 
Gross earnings (NOK 1994) Tax 
(0 – 17000) 0 
(17000 – 24709) 0.25M - 4250 
(24709 – 28250) 0.078M   
(28250 – 140500) 0.302M - 6328 
(140500 – 208000) 0.358M - 14196 
(208000 – 234500) 0.453M - 33956 
(234500 – ) 0.495M - 43804 
(*)Taxes include the part of social security contributions paid by the employee. 
Table 2.3. The 2001 tax function for singles without children and couples without children and with two wage 
earners(*)  
Gross earnings (NOK 2001) Tax 
[0 – 22200) 0 
[22200 – 32267) 0.25Y – 5550 
[32267 – 60600) 0.078Y 
[60600 – 144545) 0.358Y – 16968 
[144545 – 183182) 0.296Y – 8064 
[183182 – 289000) 0.358Y – 19 348 
[289000 – 793200) 0.493Y – 58 363 
[793200 – ) 0.553Y – 105 955 
(*)Taxes include the part of social security contributions paid by the employee. 
Table 2.4. Observed and predicted relative distributions of disposable income in 2001. Mean decile 
income in percent of mean income 
Couples Single females Single males Deciles 
Observed Simulated Observed Simulated Observed Simulated 
1 50 49 45 47 41 42 
2 68 64 56 61 54 55 
3 77 74 68 71 65 67 
4 83 83 79 79 76 76 
5 89 90 90 88 87 86 
6 95 98 101 98 97 97 
7 102 107 111 108 107 108 
8 111 117 123 121 119 121 
9 125 131 139 138 137 141 
10 199 187 189 188 218 207 
9 129 128 142 136 150 135 
10 159 151 177 166 178 161 
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Table 3.1. Estimates of the parameters of the individual welfare function, Norway 1994 
Variable Parameter Estimate Stand.dev. 
Income after tax (y)   
 1  -0.649 0.086   
 2  3.026 0.138 
Leisure (L)    
 3  -12.262 0.556 
 4  0.045 0.011 
 
 Table 3.2. Distributional weight profiles of four different social welfare functions  
 W1 
(Bonferroni) 
W2 
(Gini) 
W3 W   
(Utilitarian) 
q(.01)/q(.5) 6.64 1.98 1,33 1 
q(.05)/q(.5) 4,32 1,90 1,33 1 
q(.30)/q(.5) 1,74 1,40 1,21 1 
q(.95)/q(.5) 0,07 0,10 0,13 1 
 
Table 4.1  Optimal tax rules according to alternative social welfare criteria(*).  
 Social welfare function 
 W1 (Bonferroni) W2 (Gini) W3 W  (Utilitarian) 
1  -0.30 -0.80 -0.70 -0.80 
2  0.06 0.20 0.22 0.24 
3  0.29 0.26 0.26 0.29 
4  0.39 0.38 0.37 0.33 
5  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
t  -13 600 -7 500 -5 200  -5 800 
1z  10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 
2z  120 000 130 000 140 000 230 000 
3z  220 000 230 000 240 000 290 000 
4z  730 000 720 000 720 000 790 000 
(*) t, 1z , 2 3z , z and 4z are in 1994 NOK.  
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  Table 4.2 Percentage of individuals by income intervals under different tax systems.   
 Proportions located in various gross income segments 
Income intervals 1994 tax system 
 Couples (Males) Couples (Females) Single Males Single Females 
0 –30 000 5  16 0 0 
30 000 – 130 000 11 33 26 24 
130 000 – 230 000 31 35 41 51 
230 000 – 730 000 52 16 33 24 
730 000 -> 2 0 0 0 
     
   W1 – optimal tax system      
0 –30 000 2 10 0 0 
30 000 – 130 000 9 32 22 22 
130 000 – 230 000 29 41 42 51 
230 000 – 730 000 58 17 35 27 
730 000 -> 2 0 0 0 
          
 W2 – optimal tax system      
0 –30 000 3 12 0 0 
30 000 – 130 000 9 32 23 22 
130 000 – 230 000 28 39 41 50 
230 000 – 730 000 59 17 36 28 
730 000 -> 1 0 0 0 
      
 W3 – optimal tax system 
0 –30 000 3 12 0 0 
30 000 – 130 000 8 31 23 21 
130 000 – 230 000 27 39 41 50 
230 000 – 730 000 60 17 36 28 
730 000 -> 2 0 0 0 
      
 
W 
- optimal tax system 
0 –30 000 3 13 0 0 
30 000 – 130 000 8 31 22 20 
130 000 – 230 000 25 37 40 50 
230 000 – 730 000 62 18 38 30 
730 000 -> 2 0 0 0 
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Table 4.3  Percentage changes in participation rates, annual hours of work and disposable income 
under the optimal tax rules  
  Social welfare function 
   
W1 
(Bonferroni)
W2 
(Gini) 
 
W3 
 
W  
(Utilitarian) 
Participation rates 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Annual hours 4.9 5.0 5.1 6.0 Single males 
Disposable income 10.0 9.7 10.0 11.9 
       
Participation rates 4.0 4.4 4.4 4.8 
Annual hours 6.0 6.6 6.6 9.0 Single females 
Disposable income 4.7 4.6 4.5 6.6 
       
Participation rates, M 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.7 
Participation rates, F 5.8 4.3 3.9 3.3 
Annual hours, M 5.9 6.2 6.6 9.4 
Annual hours, F 10.6 8.1 7.0 6.3 
Couples 
Disposable income 9.2 9.4 9.9 13.3 
 
Table 4.4  Percentage changes in labour supply (total hours) by household income decile under the 
optimal tax rules  
  Social welfare function 
  W1 
(Bonferroni) 
W2 
(Gini) 
 
W3 
 
W  
(Utilitarian) 
         
 
Income decile under the 1994 system 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
I 60.5 64.7 57.3 54.4 62.8 54.4 62.8 60.3 
II 18.6 17.9 18.6 21.3 18.6 21.3 20.3 29.3 
III-VIII 0.9 3.0 1.2 4.5 1.1 4.5 1.7 7.2 
IX 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 -0.4 
X 1.3 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.3 0.0 
Singles 
All 4.9 6.0 5.0 6.6 5.1 6.6 6.0 9.0 
          
I 50.4 74.4 43.8 60.7 42.8 56.0 49.5 60.8 
II 22.2 22.9 23.3 19.5 22.9 20.5 32.7 18.6 
III-VIII 2.6 7.7 3.5 5.1 4.2 3.6 6.7 2.7 
IX 0.7 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.5 1.2 -0.3 
X -3.3 0.0 -2.9 0.2 -2.9 0.9 -1.4 0.1 
Couples 
All 5.9 10.6 6.2 8.1 6.6 7.0 9.4 6.3 
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Table 4.5. Percentage of winners under optimal tax rules  
  
Social welfare function 
  W1 (Bonferroni) W2 (Gini) 
 
W3 
 
W (Utilitarian) 
 Income decile 
under the 1994 
system 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
I 79 76 83 72 83 72 79 69 
II 66 62 66 55 62 55 55 55 
III-VIII 86 68 85 68 81 68 77 66 
IX 79 45 83 45 83 45 83 48 
X 76 34 79 38 79 38 86 41 
 
 
Singles  
All 82 63 82 62 79 62 76 61 
          
I 62 64 64 67 62 65 61 64 
II 70 72 72 73 73 73 70 73 
III-VIII 84 85 84 86 84 87 83 87 
IX 85 87 86 88 88 90 88 91 
X 71 69 72 70 74 72 79 78 
 
 
Couples 
All 79 80 70 81 80 82 79 83 
 
 
 
  
 
